Surender Malhan v. Attorney General New Jersey by unknown
2021 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-4-2021 
Surender Malhan v. Attorney General New Jersey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021 
Recommended Citation 
"Surender Malhan v. Attorney General New Jersey" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 217. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/217 
This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 





SURENDER MALHAN,  
           Appellant 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOES 1 TO 10; 
 CITY OF BAYONNE 
      
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-08889) 
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton 
      
 
Argued on November 18, 2020 
Before: AMBRO, BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed:  March 4, 2021) 
 
Paul A. Clark  (Argued) 
Suite 1N 
10 Huron Avenue 
Jersey City, NJ 07306 
  Counsel for Appellant 
 
 
Gurbir S. Grewal 




Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 
Division of Law 
25 Market Street 
Hughes Justice Complex 
1st Floor, West Wing 
Trenton, NJ 08625 
  Counsel for Appellee Attorney General of New Jersey 
 
R. Scott Fahrney, Jr. (Argued) 
Kaufman Semeraro & Leibman 
Two Executive Drive 
Suite 530 
Fort Lee, NJ 07024 




AMBRO, Circuit Judge  
 
Surender Malhan sued New Jersey’s Attorney General (the “AG”) and the City of 
Bayonne (the “City” together with the AG, the “Government Defendants”) after he was 
prosecuted for charges of stalking and harassment that were later dismissed.  For the 
reasons explained below, we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Malhan’s claims for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as its grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
City on Malhan’s malicious-prosecution claim.   
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




 Since 2011, Malhan has been in contentious divorce and custody proceedings with 
his estranged wife, Alina Myronova.  The dispute resulted in several lawsuits in federal 
court.  See, e.g., Malhan v. Sec’y United States Dep’t of State, 938 F.3d 453, 455 (3d Cir. 
2019).  At issue here are several charges against Malhan for stalking and harassment 
between 2015 and 2017.  In June 2015, based on an incident report filed by Myronova’s 
boyfriend, Jeffrey Rothstein, the City charged Malhan with a single count of harassment 
in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:33-4.  It dismissed that charge a month later, and 
Malhan and Rothstein agreed to a mutual no-contact order.  In June 2016, Myronova filed 
a domestic violence harassment and stalking incident report, alleging Malhan had been 
threatening her and requesting a temporary restraining order (“TRO”).  After concluding 
there was probable cause for the harassment (N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:33-4A) and stalking 
(N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:12-10B) charges, the Bayonne City Municipal Court issued a 
Complaint-Warrant against Malhan and a TRO prohibiting him from possessing firearms 
and other weapons.  In December 2016, after several days of hearings, the New Jersey 
Family Court dismissed the TRO against Malhan, finding Myronova to be “incredible 
and unreasonable” and noting that she “exhibited a lack of candor with the court.”  App. 
408, 414.   
After Myronova’s 2016 report, the City referred the harassment and stalking 
charges to the Hudson County Prosecutor.  A grand jury in Hudson County indicted 
Malhan for stalking in March 2017, but there is no evidence they knew about the Family 
Court’s ruling in December 2016.  Malhan claims he never received a notice to appear 
4 
 
(allegedly mailed to his apartment building without an apartment number and with his 
name misspelled) and thus missed his arraignment.  He was arrested in April 2017 and 
spent two weeks in a New York jail.  The Hudson County Prosecutor dismissed the 
criminal indictment in October 2017 and the Bayonne Municipal Court later dismissed 
the stalking charge on remand.  Since then, Malhan has not been subject to a restraining 
order or charged with harassment or stalking.   
Malhan filed suit in the District Court against the Government Defendants.  Four 
counts in his amended complaint sought prospective declaratory and injunctive relief to 
address asserted constitutional violations, including that 1) New Jersey’s harassment 
statute is overbroad and vague with a chilling effect on free speech (Count I), 2) its broad 
ban on possession of weapons by those subject to TROs violates due process (Count II), 
3) issuing arrest warrants without adequate service of process violates due process (Count 
III), and 4) the State’s custom of granting restraining orders to women but denying them 
to men violates equal protection (Count V).  Malhan also seeks money damages from the 
City for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IV).  
II.  
A. Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief 
We exercise plenary review over a trial court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction.  
See Hamilton v. Bromley, 862 F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 2017).  Here, the District Court 
dismissed Malhan’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief (Counts I, II, and III) 
because he does not have standing to bring those claims.  Although we think the issue is 
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one of mootness and not standing, we agree with the result.  See Artway v. Att’y Gen., 81 
F.3d 1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing the difference between standing and mootness).   
 “Under our precedent, a case is moot if developments occur during the course of 
adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit or prevent 
a court from being able to grant the requested relief.”  Hamilton, 862 F.3d at 335 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Here, Malhan is no longer subject to a TRO or 
any charges for stalking or harassment, so he is not suffering any current injury for which 
we can grant relief.  He asserts two exceptions to the mootness doctrine, but neither 
applies.  First, Malhan argues his claims are “capable of repetition yet evading review.”  
However, that exception applies only in “exceptional situations where . . . there is a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action 
again.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Malhan fails to meet that 
burden.  His assertions of possible repetition are “necessarily predicated on the unique 
features of a particular series of events.”  Id. at 336 (cleaned up).  Myronova and 
Rothstein have not accused him of stalking or harassment in over three years, and there is 
no evidence they will do so again.  Even if they do, Malhan will be armed with the 
Family Court’s finding as to Myronova’s lack of credibility, which is likely to deter 
future prosecutions based on her allegations.  Malhan also has not shown the errors with 
his address and name may be repeated with future service of process.  Indeed, when 
asked if he could be charged again in the future, Malhan testified only that “anything is 
possible.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 8 n.9.  This is the kind of “theoretical possibility” that is “not 
enough to invoke the capable-of-repetition exception.”  Hamilton, 862 F.3d at 337; see 
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also City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (holding that appellant’s claim 
for injunctive relief is moot because “there was no finding that [he] faced a real and 
immediate threat of [repeated illegal conduct]”).   
 Second, Malhan argues that each dismissal of charges against him in 2016 and 
2017 was a voluntary cessation.  We recently explained that voluntary cessation should 
not be viewed as an exception to mootness, but rather “a recurring situation in which 
courts are particularly skeptical of mootness arguments.”  Hartnett v. Pa. State Educ. 
Ass’n, 963 F.3d 301, 307 (3d Cir. 2020).  The voluntary cessation doctrine does not apply 
here because the Government Defendants are not responsible for the cessation.  Instead, 
the Hudson County Prosecutor dropped the criminal charges against Malhan, and the 
Family Court dismissed the TRO.  Malhan provides no evidence the Government 
Defendants influenced or directed those decisions.  On the contrary, while Malhan’s 
situation is regrettable, the evidence suggests the prosecutors and courts did their job and 
dismissed the charges against Malhan when it was appropriate to do so.  In any event, we 
have no reason to suspect the Government Defendants will resume the alleged 
unconstitutional conduct against Malhan when this litigation ends.  See Marcavage v. 
Nat’l Park Serv., 666 F.3d 856, 861 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Government officials are presumed 
to act in good faith.” (cleaned up)); see also Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. v. U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 54–55 (1st Cir. 2013) (explaining that 
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voluntary cessation doctrine is concerned with manipulative litigants who alter their 
behavior “long enough to secure a dismissal and then reinstating it immediately after”).1   
B. Malicious Prosecution Claim 
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Malhan’s 
damages claim for malicious prosecution.  Dist. Ct. Op. 9.  Our review over a grant of 
summary judgment is anew.  Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir. 
2003).  We agree with the District Court for two reasons.2   
First, probable cause supports the charges against Malhan, thus defeating a 
malicious-prosecution claim.  Id. at 521 (“To prove malicious prosecution under section 
1983, a plaintiff must show that . . . the proceeding was initiated without probable 
cause.”).  The charges were supported by allegations filed by Rothstein and Myronova.  
Malhan’s indictment by a grand jury for stalking further supports probable cause.  See 
Camiolo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 334 F.3d 345, 363 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[A] grand 
 
1 The Count V claim for equal protection is moot for the reasons described above, given 
Malhan is no longer subject to any restraining orders or injunctions.  Alternatively, we 
agree the District Court properly dismissed that claim because Malhan failed to name the 
fictitious defendants in his complaint.  Dist. Ct. Op. 6 n.8.  Indeed, the header for Count 
V in Malhan’s Second Amended Complaint asserts the claim against “John Does 1 
through 10,” but does not name the Government Defendants.  App’x 56.  To correct this 
issue, Malhan should have asked the District Court for leave to file an amended 
complaint, which he did not do.   
 
2 Malhan argues that he also sought money damages from the City under Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  The District Court properly 
decided that, because Malhan did not raise the Monell claim in any of the complaints he 
filed, he cannot raise it for the first time at summary judgment.   
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jury indictment or presentment constitutes prima facie evidence of probable cause to 
prosecute.” (quoting Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 353 (3d Cir. 1989))).   
Second, Malhan has not shown the City acted maliciously.  In fact, he admits that 
Myronova lied to the City.  App’x 151 (“Q.  Now, is it your belief that Ms. Myronova 
lied to the City of Bayonne?  A. [Malhan]: Absolutely.”).  Based on this, no reasonable 
jury could determine that the City held ill-will against Malhan or recklessly disregarded 
his rights.  In this context, the City appears deceived by the allegations.  See Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987) (“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law 
enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that 
probable cause is present.”).   
*    *    *    *    * 
 Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s decision to dismiss Malhan’s claims for 
injunctive and declaratory relief (Counts I, II, III, V), dismiss his Monell claim against the 
City because it was raised for the first time on summary judgment, and grant summary 
judgment in favor of the City on Malhan’s malicious-prosecution claim (Count IV).   
 
